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Introduction
Over the past few years, increasing evidence has
established the importance of new and young
companies to the American economy. The
painstaking assembly of three decades of data by
economists at the U.S. Census Bureau, together with
further research and analysis done by the Kauffman
Foundation, has demonstrated that startups and
young firms (those less than five years old) account
for nearly all net job creation in the United States.1
Indeed, the importance of these companies in
creating new jobs now appears to be well-recognized
in national discussions of economic policy.2
Nevertheless, this idea continues to surprise (and
disappoint) many analysts: How can startups and
young companies, conventionally understood to be
the most volatile part of the economy, be the
principal font of new jobs? Won’t many of the jobs
created by such companies subsequently disappear?
And, even if new and young firms account for most
net job creation, what about their effect on
employment in existing companies—do they
simultaneously destroy jobs elsewhere in the
economy, thus nullifying the effect of their own 
job creation?
Such questions point toward the need for a more
complete understanding of the dynamics of firm
formation and job creation in the United States.
Specifically, as an initial approach to these issues,
this paper addresses the first-order question: Why
do new and young firms create (or appear to create)
nearly all net new jobs? After digging into the data
on firm formation, this paper comes to the
conclusion that there are distinct reasons for the
patterns we see in terms of job creation and firm
age. As the American economy (or any economy)
moves through time, the number of firms
populating it accumulates—that is, there is a
progressively larger volume of firms each year. With
relatively steady levels of firm entry and exit (as the
American economy has experienced), in any given
Abstract
An increasing number of studies and reports have shown that new and young companies account for most net job creation in the United States. This empirically documented reality, however, is not exclusively aresult of new and young companies being particularly prolific or idiosyncratically superior to other firms.
Indeed, concepts such as job creation and entrepreneurship increasingly are conflated with young and small firms.
Yet the age breakdown of job creation is partly a reflection of the dynamics of firm accumulation—how firms enter
and exit and survive over a period of time. In any given year in the U.S. economy, new and young companies
represent a plurality of all firms in the economy. That is, they make up the largest bloc of firms by age category,
meaning their considerable job creation record is partly structural. This does not mitigate the contribution of these
companies to job creation, but that contribution must be seen in the proper structural context.
1. The principal dataset for this empirically established claim, as well as the analysis in this paper, is the Business Dynamics Statistics dataset, 
at http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds_overview. See also John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda, “Jobs Created from Business Startups in the
United States,” Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing, Kauffman Foundation, January 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/BDS_Jobs_Created_011209b.pdf;
John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda, “High Growth and Failure of Young Firms,” Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing, Kauffman Foundation, March 2009,
at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/bds_high_growth_and_failure_4-6-09.pdf; Dane Stangler and Robert E. Litan, “Where Will the Jobs Come From?,” Kauffman
Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth, November 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/where_will_the_jobs_come_from.pdf;
and Tim Kane, “The Importance of Startups in Job Creation and Job Destruction,” Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth, July
2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/firm_formation_importance_of_startups.pdf. For a deeper treatment of data collection on these topics, see John
Haltiwanger, Lisa M. Lynch, and Christopher Mackie (eds.), “Understanding Business Dynamics: An Integrated Data System for America’s Future,” National Research
Council, 2007.
2. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, “Startups, Not Bailouts,” New York Times, April 3, 2010; Vivek Wadhwa, “Why Andy Grove is Wrong About Job Growth,” 
Bloomberg Businessweek, July 9, 2010.
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3. The “role played by these regularities has been to stimulate interest in the possibility that there may be some systematic economic mechanisms at work.” 
John Sutton, “Gibrat’s Legacy,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 35, 40 (March 1997). See also Dongfeng Fu, et al., “The Growth of Business Firms: Theoretical
Framework and Empirical Evidence,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, December 27, 2005; L.A.N. Amaral, et al., “A Model for the Growth
Dynamics of Economic Organizations,” Physica A 299 127 (2001) (“the range of systems that apparently display power law and, hence, scale-invariant correlations
has increased dramatically in recent years … to [include] complex systems involving large numbers [with] interacting subunits that display ‘free will’ … We have
recently shown that scale invariance holds for economic organizations.”).
4. Daniel F. Spulber, The Theory of the Firm: Microeconomics with Endogenous Entrepreneurs, Firms, Markets, and Organizations 367 (Cambridge, 2009). 
See also William J. Baumol, The Microtheory of Innovative Entrepreneurship (Princeton, 2010).
5. Some parts of this paper are based on previous work. See Dane Stangler, “From a Drunkard’s Walk to a Pile of Drunks,” April 9, 2010, at
http://www.growthology.org/growthology/2010/04/from-a-drunkards-walk-to-a-pile-of-drunks.html; Dane Stangler, “The Accumulation of Firms and the Predominance
of New and Young Companies,” April 13, 2010, at http://www.growthology.org/growthology/2010/04/the-accumulation-of-firms-and-the-predominance-of-new-and-
young-companies.html; and Dane Stangler, “The Neutralist View of Entrepreneurship,” Keynote Address at Conference on the Law and Economics of the Entrepreneur,
Northwestern Law School, June 17, 2010.
6. Dane Stangler and Paul Kedrosky, “Exploring Firm Formation: Why is the Number of New Firms Constant?” Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation
and Economic Growth, January 2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/exploring_firm_formation_1-13-10.pdf.
year new and young companies will constitute the
largest bloc of firms in the economy. Partly as a
result—and only partly—this bloc also contributes
the largest number of net new jobs to the economy. 
In other words, there is a structural context in which
firm formation and job creation occur that helps
explain why new and young companies dominate net
job creation. This in no way diminishes the
contribution of new and young companies or their
economic importance—after all, it remains true that
they generate most net new jobs. But by studying the
economic structure, we can perhaps unearth the
reasons behind that importance. Such reasons, as
discussed below, cannot be taken as immutable.
Without understanding the structural features of
entrepreneurial capitalism—the why of firm formation
and job creation—we could end up taking steps that
undermine those features. The dynamics explored
here, moreover, parallel prior findings of statistical
regularities concerning firm development.3
Huge gains have been made in recent years
toward fully integrating entrepreneurs and new
firms into economic theory. Dan Spulber has made
the simple yet profound observation that the
entrepreneur’s economic contribution is the creation
of the firm itself: “Firms create and manage markets
that enhance the efficiency of transactions … by
establishing transaction institutions, firms determine
the market microstructure of the economy.”4 This
paper cannot hope to match the theoretical depth
and insight of Spulber and Will Baumol on these
topics, but we hope the analysis here of the
structural dynamics of firm formation, and exit and
accumulation, will make a supplemental
contribution to their work.
This paper proceeds as follows: To introduce and
contextualize the discussion, the next section draws
a loose parallel between the analysis presented here
and the neutral theory of evolution. Using data from
the Census Bureau and prior work, Section Three
constructs an imaginary economy to illustrate the
structural context of job creation. Section Four then
builds on that imaginary economy and looks at the
actual experience of the American economy to see
the breakdown of firm age and job creation over
time. Section Five briefly raises potential avenues of
research, and the concluding section discusses what
it means in terms of economic change.5
A Neutral Theory of
Entrepreneurship?
Since 1977, the level and rate of firm formation in
the United States have been relatively constant. Firm
formation fluctuates from year to year, of course,
but the band of variance within which it fluctuates is
remarkably narrow. A previous paper in this
Kauffman Foundation Research Series briefly
suggested a similarity between this state of affairs
and the neutral theory of evolution promulgated by
biologist Motoo Kimura in the late 1960s.6 Kimura,
building on prior research in population genetics and
molecular evolution, posited a baseline rate of
mutation-driven change that, from the standpoint of
genetic and physiological evolution, is largely
7. This did not quite wholly contradict, but certainly qualified, much of the established wisdom in evolutionary biology at the time, although the neutral theory is
today a rather well-accepted part of the field. See, e.g., James F. Crow, “Motoo Kimura and the Rise of Neutralism,” in Oren Harman and Michael R. Dietrich (eds.),
Rebels, Mavericks, and Heretics in Biology (2008). See also Stephen Jay Gould, “Betting on Chance—and No Fair Peeking,” in Eight Little Piggies: Reflections in
Natural History (1993).
8. Matt Ridley, The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves 49 (Harper, 2010).
9. See John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967).
10. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 82 (1942) (Harper Perennial, 1962).
11. See Howard Aldrich and Ellen R. Auster, “Even Dwarfs Started Small: Liabilities of Age and Size and Their Strategic Implications,” Research in Organizational
Behavior, Vol. 8, 165–198 (1986); Brian Headd and Bruce Kirchhoff, “The Growth, Decline, and Survival of Small Businesses: An Exploratory Study of Life Cycles,”
Journal of Small Business Management, vol. 47, 531–550 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Steven Rose (ed.), The Richness of Life: The Essential Stephen Jay Gould (Norton, 2006); David Sepkoski, “Stephen Jay Gould, Darwinian Iconoclast?” 
in Oren Harman and Michael R. Dietrich (eds.), Rebels, Mavericks, and Heretics in Biology (2008).
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neutral.7 The forces of selection thus act against this
background; rather than seeing evolution as a process
of ceaseless upheaval, it now can be seen, in part, as
something more, well, selective: “Natural selection is
a conservative force. It spends more of its time
keeping species the same than changing them.”8
This paper takes the posited parallel a bit further.
Once upon a time in economic thought, it was
seemingly well-established that the economy either
didn’t change much or had matured to a point at
which change was no longer necessary. John
Kenneth Galbraith, for example, excised the
entrepreneur from economic progress in his 1967
book, The New Industrial State. No longer would
new firms and innovations create waves in the
economy; rather, the “technostructure” of big
companies and big government successfully
managed both demand and supply and, thereafter,
innovations would emerge from that structure.9
Clearly, such an observation either never reflected
economic reality (Intel was founded the year after
Galbraith’s declaration of stasis) or was quickly
overtaken by events. The most perceptive economist
of the past century was Joseph Schumpeter, who
observed: “Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or
method of economic change and not only never is,
but never can be, stationary.”10 No one can step back
and compare the march of capitalism over the past
200 years with the hundreds of millennia preceding it
and not observe that change is indeed the hallmark
of capitalism. Given this, however, the relatively
constant level of firm formation in the United States
throws up something of a dilemma. Some may say
that we have reached a state in economic history in
which there is a steady level of annual turmoil and
turnover: firms entering, exiting, growing, shrinking,
and so on, each year. This would make for a rather
unsettling economic existence, but there is little doubt
that such turnover has characterized some sectors of
the American economy.
Yet there is also another way to perceive this state
of affairs, somewhat akin to the neutral theory of
evolution. The best dataset available on firm
formation in the United States, the Business
Dynamics Statistics, extends back only to 1977. 
For prior years, data either are incomplete or
incomparable or both. If we momentarily suspend
concerns of comparability, however, and examine a
variety of studies and datasets from the past several
decades, it actually appears as if firm formation in
the United States may have been more or less
constant for the past century.11 Similar to what
Kimura did with molecular change and natural
selection, we can actually turn around the idea of
firm formation and job creation, and see it as
perhaps a force for stability in the American
economy. Just as selection in evolutionary biology
now is seen as a combination of change, adaptive
fit, and certain structural constraints,12 the analysis
here suggests that firm formation and job creation
are embedded in a structure that shapes firm
formation and the contribution of new and young
firms to job creation.
An Imaginary Economy
We start by constructing an economy that begins
with an empty landscape—no preexisting
businesses. Using average inputs from the American
economy over the past thirty years, we will plug in
an average entry of 500,000 new businesses, as well
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13. See, e.g., Amy E. Knaup, “Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics Data,” Monthly Labor Review, May 2005; Amy E. Knaup and Merissa C.
Piazza, “Business Employment Dynamics Data: Survival and Longevity, II,” Monthly Labor Review, September 2007; Brian Headd, “Redefining Business Success:
Distinguishing Between Closure and Failure,” Small Business Economics, vol. 21, 51–61 (August 2003); Brian Headd and Bruce Kirchhoff, “The Growth, Decline, 
and Survival of Small Businesses: An Exploratory Study of Life Cycles,” Journal of Small Business Management, vol. 47, 531–550 (2009).
14. See, e.g., Charles I. Stubbart and Michael B. Knight, “The Case of the Disappearing Firms: Empirical Evidence and Implications,” Journal of Organizational
Behavior, vol. 27, 79–100 (2006).
15. This observation thus highlights the extraordinary resilience of companies that have been around since the early nineteenth century, though it also suggests that
studies purporting to identify a set of observable survival skills or best practices suffer from severe survivor bias. Survival over any period of years is indicative of some
skills, but should not be taken as an imitative model because, in part, it may just as much reflect the failure of other companies in addition to one company’s survival.
Figure 1: 
Average Survival of New Businesses, 1977–2001
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Source: Calculated from Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).
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as survival rates imputed from the Business
Dynamics Statistics series. We want to see what the
population of firms looks like in terms of entry and
exit over an extended period of time. 
For firms founded since 1977, the average survival
line over five years is represented in Figure 1.
Thus, just under 80 percent of the new firms in a
cohort survive to age one, two-thirds survive to age
two, and so forth to age five. Because the BDS
dataset aggregates firm age categories above age
five (ages six to ten and eleven to fifteen, for
example), for our imaginary economy we used
imputed survival lines extrapolated out from age five
to see the dynamics of firm entry and exit over a
longer period of time. Real-world survival lines will
be lumpier than simply an extrapolated line will be,
but prior research seems to confirm that firm survival
traces somewhat of a smooth downward slope.13
Using BDS data, for example, we can track the
survival of the dataset’s first cohort of firms, those
founded in 1977. (Note that the years on the X-axis
necessarily conform to the age aggregations: It
moves from age six to age eleven, to age sixteen, 
to age twenty-one, and to age twenty-six.) So about
23 percent of firms founded in 1977 survived to 
age twenty-six in 2003, as shown in Figure 2.
At some point, the survival line of businesses
could become fractionally asymptotic, as some
organizational research does suggest that survival
for several decades, beyond age 40, roughly, is
exceedingly rare.14 Conceivably, most firms die at
some point.15
Using real and imputed survival rates, we can
construct a population chart showing the entry, 
exit, and survival of firms each year as our imaginary
economy moves forward from its inception. 
A n  I m a g i n a r y  E c o n o m y
Kau f fman  Founda t i on  Re s e a r c h  S e r i e s :  F i rm  Fo rma t i on  a nd  E conom i c  G row th6
This economy begins with the entry of 500,000 new
businesses; in Year Two, 394,600 from this initial
batch have survived, joined by the second year’s
round of incoming businesses, another 500,000. The
economy now is populated by 894,600 businesses.
If we continue this process over forty years, the
organizational population of businesses classified by
age looks as represented in Figure 3.
After one decade, firms aged five and younger
account for more than two-thirds of all businesses in
the economy. In Year Twenty-five, new and young
businesses account for almost 40 percent of all
businesses—as indicated on the chart. Put another
way, one-quarter of the age categories (ages zero to
five out of twenty-five years) make up two out of
every five firms. At Year Forty, 15 percent of the age
categories will account for one-third of all firms. By
contrast, in Year Twenty-five, firms aged six to ten
(20 percent of the age categories) will constitute 
19 percent of all firms, while in Year Forty, age six 
to ten firms will make up 16 percent of all firms.
Meanwhile, the oldest firms in Year 40 (those ages
thirty-five to forty) will account for 8 percent of all
firms, while in Year Twenty-five, the oldest
companies (ages twenty-one to twenty-five) have 
a 12 percent share. (See Table 1.)
With assumed constancy of startup entry and
survival rates (assumptions based on real data, as we
will see), the absolute number of firms younger than
age five remains the same but constitutes a slightly
decreasing proportion of the entire universe of firms.
At the same time, however, in any given year, young
firms make up the largest cohort of all firms in the
economy. Even though, numerically, there will be a
steadily greater volume of older firms, new and young
firms will, proportionately, make up the largest bloc of
firms. This makes no mention, too, of what we might
think of as the back end of firm survival—if we added
the constraint that only a few companies survive past
age forty, the proportional superiority of new and
young firms would be reinforced. Our imaginary
economy is perpetually young.16
Table 1: Percentage Share of Total
Number of Firms, by Age Category
Age Category Year 10 Year 25 Year 40
0–5 67.31 39.47 33.71
6–10 32.69 19.17 16.37
21–25 n/a 12.24 10.46
35–40 n/a n/a 8.02
Figure 2: 
Survival Line for Firms Founded in 1977
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16. It also has been pointed out to us that if there were a lifetime survival cap of forty years, the average firm age in the economy likely would remain young, thus
representing another pathway by which job creation emerges from younger firms. Thank you to Brink Lindsey for this observation.
17. For a slightly related finding, albeit confined to manufacturing, see Timothy Dunne, Mark Roberts, and Larry Samuelson, “Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S.
Manufacturing Industries,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 19, 495–515 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Robert L. Axtell, “Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Size,” Science, vol. 293, September 7, 2001; Robert Axtell, “Firm Sizes: Facts, Formulae, Fables, and
Fantasies,” Brookings Institution, Center on Social and Economic Dynamics Working Paper No. 44, February 2006 (“a deep understanding of business firms will surely
have as its cornerstone the notion that there are universal aspects to firm growth, just as there are universal features in tree growth”). 
19. For additional reading on scaling laws and the distribution of firm size and growth rates, as well as studies of entry and exit, see Luis A. Nunes Amaral, et al.,
“Scaling Behavior in Economics: I. Empirical Results for Company Growth,” arXiv, February 1997, at http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/9702082; Richard E. Caves,
“Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and Mobility of Firms,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 36, 1947–1982 (December 1998); 
Giulio Bottazzi and Angelo Secchi, “Explaining the Distribution of Firm Growth Rates,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37, 235–256 (Summer 2006).
20. See also Robert Axtell, “The Emergence of Firms in a Population of Agents: Local Increasing Returns, Unstable Nash Equilibria, and Power Law Size Distributions,”
Brookings Institution, Center on Social and Economic Dynamics Working Paper No. 3, June 1999, at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.94.1964&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
This is all perhaps somewhat obvious: Of course
new and young firms make up the largest chunk of
companies in the economy. There are simply more of
them! And this is precisely the point—with the steady
entry of new firms and gradually diminishing survival
rates over time the pyramid of firms in any economy
will look like this.17 This echoes, and is perhaps a
corollary of, the Zipf distribution of firm size—the
United States contains a handful of gigantic firms and
many small companies.18 But this is not merely a
restatement of the firm-size distribution.19 Firm age
and size are related but not entirely overlapping—
most young firms will be small (because a new firm
necessarily begins at a small size) but not all small
firms are young, and there are, in fact, some young
firms that attain substantial size rather quickly. While
the structure of firm size may help inform the present
analysis as to subsequent selection (see below), it is
not clear that the age distribution is as immutable as
the size distribution seems to be. Age, moreover, also
may be a function of time in a way size is not—the
age distribution, in fact, could help explain the Zipf
distribution of firm size.20
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Figure 3: 
Accumulation of Firms through Birth, Death, and Survival
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The obviousness of firm accumulation and the
greater proportionality of younger firms is partly the
point of this analysis. But, there are profound
consequences for job creation: It is embedded within
this structure of firm entry and survival and
accumulation. Just as every price in the economy
represents a relative rather than absolute value, so
too must job creation by firms of different ages be
seen relative to this structure. The jobs contribution
of new and young firms, that is, could be, in part, a
function of the arithmetic of firm accumulation.
Of course, simply because new and young firms
represent the largest cohort in terms of firm age, it
doesn’t automatically follow that they will or should
create the largest annual number of new jobs. The
calculation of net job creation includes not only those
firms that survive, but also those that fail and, thus,
destroy a good number of jobs. Since firms younger
than age five tend to be the most volatile in terms of
firm failure and job destruction, we might reasonably
expect this cohort to be a disproportionately low
contributor to net job creation.21 In spite of their
larger volume, then, it still could be true that new
and young firms punch below their weight, as it
were, in terms of job creation.
We know from Census Bureau data, however, that
it is, in fact, true that new and young firms account
for the lion’s share of net new jobs in the United
States.22 Therefore, one way to understand this
remarkable characteristic of the American economy is
as a function of firm entry and survival and
accumulation—as a function of the numbers. In any
case, in terms of a purely hypothetical economy based
on average numbers from the United States economy
over the past thirty years, we can make some
tentative conclusions. The dynamics behind the jobs
contribution of new and young firms includes some
structural features—there will always be more new
and young firms, making it highly probable that more
net job creation will come from these companies,
rather than from their older counterparts.23
Firm Formation and Job
Creation in the United
States Since 1977
We now turn to the actual experience of the
American economy over the past thirty years: On an
annual basis, what has the economy’s composition
looked like in terms of firm age? How closely has
reality tracked our imaginary extrapolation? Does
this account for the large contribution of jobs from
new and young firms? We begin by treating 1977,
the first year in the dataset, as the ab initio year for
the economy, including only those firms that came
into existence from 1977 onward.24 Figure 4
indicates how, over the next twenty-eight years, the
accumulation of firms shaped the age composition
of the economy.
We can clearly see from Figure 4 that young firms
(ages one to five) comprise the largest demographic
sector in any given year, consistent with our
imaginary economy. Note, too, how few firms are
included at the top by 2005 in the twenty-six to
twenty-eight age category. These were firms
founded 1977–1979 and, by 2005, 19 percent of
firms founded in those three years remained. Recall
that in Figure 2 the long-term survival rate for these
businesses followed a steady downward slope.
So Figure 4 confirms that young firms dominate
the economy in terms of volume. However, this still
conveys an incomplete picture because it excludes
any companies founded before 1977. While the BDS
dataset only starts with 1977, it does include a “left
censored” category that includes all firms founded
before 1977, but with no specification as to age. In
1977, then, these firms could be anywhere from one
21. See, e.g., John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda, “Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young,” Working Paper, July 2009, at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/HaltiwangerJarminMirandaWhoCreatesJobsjuly8.pdf. 
22. See sources listed supra note 1.
23. When they come into existence, startups can only create jobs, not destroy them. (This says nothing of their effect on existing companies; it only refers to within-
firm job creation.) Thus, at the moment of firm inception, gross job creation equals net job creation. See, e.g., Paul Kedrosky, “Drunks, A Wall, Entrepreneurs, and
Jobs,” April 9, 2010, at http://www.growthology.org/growthology/2010/04/drunks-wall-entrepreneurs-and-jobs.html.
24. Note that the charts in this section will not follow precisely the same format as in the preceding section because the latter extrapolated out beyond age five on an
annual basis, whereas the actual BDS data aggregates firms into five-year categories after the fifth year: six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, twenty-one to
twenty-five, twenty-six to twenty-eight, and twenty-nine plus. Startups are defined as age zero.
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Figure 4: 
Age Composition of Firms in the Economy, 1977–2005
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Aggregating five-year age groups of firms (except startups, which are broken out separately), this chart 
compares the accumulation of firms over time and how the composition changes. Firms in the one to five age 
group remain the largest category—not a majority, but the biggest in terms of numbers.
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to 100 years old. Yet, the dataset allows us to track
their post-1977 survival and compare the resulting
composition of firms. We can thus compare pre-
1977 firms with new and young companies in all
subsequent years, as shown in Figure 5.
In this visualization, new and young firms cannot
constitute the largest demographic bloc of firms in
any given year because of the preponderance of
older companies.25 By 1988, new and young
companies have overtaken the pre-1977 firms to
become the largest group because each year the
pre-1977 firms constitute a steadily smaller share of
firms. This does not vitiate the point of the paper,
however, because the nature of the data is such that
we cannot compare pre- and post-1977 firms with
any further specification. It is not the case that 1988
marked the first time in American history that new
and young firms became a plurality of companies. If
we knew, for example, the exact ages of pre-1977
firms, the chart would look much different, and it is
likely that new and young firms would constitute a
plurality in every year we would chart. This chart
simply illustrates, within the confines of the dataset
and using 1977 as the hinge year, what the U.S.
economy has looked like as the undifferentiated
mass of older companies has given way to annual
new crops of firms. It shows, however, that the
notion of turnover so often celebrated by economic
analysts is partly a derivative function of embedded
structure.
25. “Older,” of course, is a relative term. In 1977, the pre-1977 category of “older” firms included a large number of young companies from the previous five years—
likely a plurality, in fact. On the other end, the age classifications of these data mean that any company age six and older is categorized, somewhat imprecisely, as
old or at least not young.
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Figure 6 combines the prior two charts and
includes the pre-1977 firms in an overall chart of all
firm ages since 1977.
This is actually an incredibly interesting chart
because it illustrates the pathways by which firm
composition changes and new and young firms
consistently account for the bulk of firms in the
economy. In 1977, the t=0 moment in these data,
the economy is composed of a class of startups (age
zero) and all other existing firms that were founded
before 1977. Again, these vary from age one to
100. As the economy moves through time from
1977, we actually see four things happen. First, new
(age zero) and young (ages one to five) firms
account for a steady slice of all firms. Second, the
overall number of firms accumulates, growing by
nearly two-thirds from 1977 to 2005. Third, as in
Figure 4, the pre-1977 firms gradually diminish in
number and share. Fourth, post-1977 firms grow
older and gradually diminish in terms of their
numbers as fewer survive in subsequent years—a
slowing slope of failure acts upon a shrinking pool
of survivors.26
Finally, once again excluding pre-1977 firms, the
point can be illustrated by the percentage share of
the total number of firms, by age category, as
shown in Figure 7.
26. “[E]ntry cumulatively contributes a lot to turnover in the enterprise population.” Richard E. Caves, “Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and
Mobility of Firms,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 36, 1947–1982 (December 1998).
Figure 5: 
Firms Founded Prior to 1977, and New/Young Firms (Ages 0–5) 
Founded 1977 and After
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By 1988, the young firms now have reached a steady state, and the pre-1977 firms gradually have diminished and 
comprise a smaller share than young firms. (So, in 1988, the firms could be age twelve and older.)
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Figure 6: 
All Firms in the Economy, By Age, Over Time
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Firms ages zero to five account for between 30 percent and 40 percent of all firms between 1983 and 
2005. This naturally falls, albeit slowly, over time as the total number of firms increases, but this 
age group remains a plurality in terms of five-year age categories.
Figure 7: 
Share of Total Number of Firms, By Age
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27. “While small and large firms provide roughly equivalent shares of jobs, the major part of job generation and destruction takes place in the small-firm sector, and
small firms provide the greater share of net new jobs. In some ways, this role as a major creator and destroyer of jobs is a result of being the major creator and
destroyer of businesses in general.” Brian Headd, “An Analysis of Small Business and Jobs,” Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, March 2010, at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs359tot.pdf. 
28. Robert L. Axtell, “Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Size,” Science, vol. 293, September 7, 2001.
29. Brian Headd, “An Analysis of Small Business and Jobs,” Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, March 2010, at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs359tot.pdf (citing Business Employment Dynamics data).
30. Brian Headd, “An Analysis of Small Business and Jobs,” Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, March 2010, at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs359tot.pdf.
31. See Brian Headd and Bruce Kirchhoff, “The Growth, Decline, and Survival of Small Businesses: An Exploratory Study of Life Cycles,” Journal of Small Business
Management, vol. 47, 531–550 (2009).
32. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Measuring Entrepreneurship: A Collection of Indicators, 2009 Edition,” OECD-Eurostat
Entrepreneurship Indicators Programme (2009), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/44068449.pdf
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Once the economy reaches a point at which it
includes firms older than age six in 1983 (and
remember, pre-1977 firms account for the missing
shares on this chart), new and young companies
account for between 30 percent and 40 percent of
all firms in the economy. This percentage naturally
falls over time, albeit slowly, as the overall number
of firms grows, but this demographic of firms is
nonetheless a plurality each year, something that
would persist over time—recall the new and young
company shares in Years Twenty-five and Forty of
our imaginary economy. There are clearly structural
dynamics at work that help explain the provenance
of new jobs.27 As Axtell observed with regard to the
size distribution of firms: “The Zipf distribution is an
unambiguous target that any empirically accurate
theory of the firm must hit. This result … places
important limits on models of firm dynamics.”28
Likewise, the preponderance of young firms may
help explain an enduring feature of employment
churn in the United States. For about the past twenty
years, net job creation from “continuing” companies
has been greater than that from businesses opening
and closing.29 (A “continuing” company is one that is
not new [age zero] and not dying—so, a company
that is between age one and death [closure].) The
net jobs tally from continuing businesses that expand
and contract has been larger than the net tally from
the combined birth and death of businesses—
significantly larger, according to some datasets.
Headd points out that “the bulk of [these] job flows
is in small firms,” (small being defined as fewer than
500 employees).30 We can see this, for example, in
Census data from 2007, as represented in Figure 8:
Most net job creation emerges from “continuing”
small and medium-sized firms.
Importantly, as reflected in Figure 9, looking at the
same data through the lens of firm age indicates
that most net job creation emerges from young
firms (ages one to five), meaning most of these
small and medium-sized firms are young:
Thus, the large amount of net job creation from
continuing companies also appears to reflect the
structural dynamics of firm accumulation. This
certainly does not mean that all surviving firms in
the young cohort are adding jobs—some are
growing, some are declining, and a substantial
number are staying still, neither adding nor shedding
jobs.31 It simply means that, as an aggregate matter,
the preponderance of young firms in the economy
raises the probability that a large contribution to job
creation will come from these companies.
Remarkably, according to OECD data, it also appears
as if the share of firms accounted for by young firms
is broadly similar across a wide range of countries.32
Thus, the phenomenon discussed here should not be
interpreted as strictly a feature of the American
economy.
It is important to note what this analysis is not
saying. We are not claiming that the distribution of
performance indicators such as market share or
innovation or growth rates also follow the shape of
accumulation set forth here. This is an exploration of
the structural dynamics beneath the fact that new
and young firms account for so much net job
creation—that is, the additional increment of net
new jobs added to the economy each year.
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Figure 8: 
Net Job Creation in Continuing Firms by Size, 2007
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Source: Calculated from Percent of Annualized Lifetime Net Job Creation for Firms in 2007. Source: Special Tabulation 
performed by U.S. Census Bureau from Business Dynamics Statistics. See also Dane Stangler and Robert E. Litan, “Where 
Will the Jobs Come From?” Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth, November 2009.
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Figure 9: 
Net Job Creation in Continuing Firms by Firm Age, 2007
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Related Research
Questions
One logical follow-on question to this discussion is
the extent to which firms survive over a longer
period of time. As noted earlier, only the tiniest
fraction of companies appears to survive for longer
than forty years. Of the companies listed in the
Fortune 500, forty were founded before 1855, and
the decades in which the highest number of current
Fortune 500 companies was founded are the first
decade of the 1900s, the 1920s, and the 1980s.33
Clearly, a healthy economy requires some admixture
of young and old, small and large.34 Four-fifths of
the companies on the list came into existence before
1970, which means these firms have managed to
survive past age forty. But this represents a sliver of
the more than six million firms in the U.S. economy,
and such long survival requires merging with and
acquiring other companies. The steady share of new
and young companies in the economy thus
represents not only a source of new job creation but
also a supply of sustenance for the oldest and
largest companies.35 Additionally, some degree of
firm entry likely induces the demise of older firms,
helping to account for the shrinking share of those
companies.
The preceding charts and discussion also raise the
question of turnover—there has been much made
of the churn of companies on lists such as the
Fortune 500 and in the economy as a whole.
Breathless analysis often holds that our era is one of
unprecedentedly rapid change, driven in large part
by “armies” of startups that create most new jobs in
the economy.36 The fact that so many companies on
today’s Fortune list were not on the list in, say, 1980,
is asserted as prima facie evidence for economic
upheaval. Turnover, turmoil, and churn, however,
cannot be analyzed apart from the structural
perspective presented here. Imagine we had a
lifetime cap of forty years on how long a firm could
survive, a law of perpetuity applied to for-profit
companies. As long as new firms continued
entering, this economy could not help but
experience constant turnover. This, in fact, appears
to closely resemble the reality of the American
economy—the line of survival slopes steadily
downward for any cohort of firms and likely
approaches zero at some age.
At the same time, we have experienced a steady
flow of firm entry and exit. Substantial turnover,
then, is to be expected as a function of firm
formation and accumulation: the Fortune 500
turnover is less remarkable than it appears.37
Imagine, conversely, that the pace of firm formation
dwindled but that survival expectations remained
the same—the accumulation of firms gradually
would come to be dominated by older companies.
Such an economy might quickly lose any semblance
of vitality.38 We also should be careful in how we
interpret survival—longevity of survival is not 
always a sign of productivity, and the fact that 
half of new firms fail to survive to age five should
not automatically be taken as a bad thing. The
alternative, however, is not a Panglossian
interpretation of the contemporary American
33. Dane Stangler, “The Economic Future Just Happened,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/the-economic-future-just-
happened.pdf.
34. See William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity (Yale, 2007).
35. Some of the “exits” observed in the data, particularly between older companies, and between the oldest and youngest companies, likely represent mergers and
acquisitions.
36. See David B. Audretsch, Innovation and Industry Evolution (MIT, 1995); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a
Revolutionary Idea (Modern Library, 2003).
37. Indeed, prior studies of turnover among the largest companies have found persistent turnover—it is a feature of capitalism, notwithstanding retrospective narratives
we wish to impose. See, e.g., Leslie Hannah, “Marshall’s ‘Trees’ and the Global ‘Forest’: Were ‘Giant Redwoods’ Different?” in Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G.
Raff, and Peter Temin (eds.), Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries (NBER, 1999); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control
(Harvard, 1990).
38. See, e.g., Carl J. Schramm, “Making the Turn: Entrepreneurial Capitalism and its European Promise,” Speech to the European Union Finance Ministers, April 8,
2006; OECD, The Sources of Economic Growth in OECD Countries (2003).
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economy. If we were somehow able to raise survival
rates, it is unclear whether this would boost
economic growth.39 In fact, from a policy standpoint,
if barriers to firm entry were lowered and we had a
corresponding increase in new-business creation, we
might actually need lower survival rates (higher
failure, greater turnover) for the selection process to
function commensurately and enhance productivity.40
Indeed, a higher volume of new business entry
might automatically lead to lower survival rates as a
function of the “easy-to-start, easy-to-close”
phenomenon identified by some studies.41
This further raises the question of the relationship
between market selection and economic growth. If
firms that eventually survive are better endowed
from the beginning (larger initial size, deeper-sunk
costs, better access to financing), then perhaps part
of what is perceived as an “up or out” dynamic
among any given cohort of companies—as well as
the number of jobs retained in surviving firms—
merely reflects the disappearance of originally
weaker (and smaller) firms.42 Those left standing,
that is, might have been better off and bigger to
begin with, as economic growth results from the
discovery and winnowing process. As Caves
observes, “the new evidence imputes more
rationality to entrants’ decisions than has generally
been assigned to them.”43 A new company that
starts out small (whether in employment size or
capital commitments) may have a lower expectation
of survival than one that starts out larger.
Subsequent survival rates thus may reflect this initial
calculus. At the same time, the rapid growth seen in
some groups of surviving firms may reflect a rational
decision to start small and “discover” the firm’s
competence—rapid growth thus would represent a
response to feedback that the firm was competent
to compete, with heavier investment on a smaller
starting base constituting the rapid growth.
Additionally, this analysis raises the interesting and
essential question of the role of firm exit or failure in
economic performance. (We are mindful that the
exit of a firm from a database should not necessarily
be equated with failure in the sense that the
founders are disappointed. Research indicates that,
in many cases, the closure of a firm is perceived as a
successful outcome.)44 The observation that “when
firms grow, the economy grows” can be true only if
accompanied by the corollary of firm exit and
decline—sectors of the economy that are populated
by rapidly growing companies also tend to have a
good number of declining companies.45 During the
1990s expansion, for example, the torrid pace of 
job creation enjoyed by the U.S. economy was
39. See, e.g., Erzo G.J. Luttmer, “Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms,” Working Paper, August 2006.
40. The regularity of firm entry and exit might seem to suggest either persistent “excess” entry (since a similar portion fail), or high barriers to entry, over which only 
a certain number of firms can make it. Of course, lack of knowledge as to which firms will survive means policy likely can do little to encourage the “right” firms 
to enter.
41. See, e.g., Brian Headd, “Redefining Business Success: Distinguishing Between Closure and Failure,” Small Business Economics, vol. 21, 51–61 (August 2003). This,
of course, would depend on the sectoral mix of the additional increment of startups.
42. See, e.g., John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier Miranda, “Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young,” NBER Working Paper No. 16300, August 2010.
43. Richard E. Caves, “Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and Mobility of Firms,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 36, 1947–1982
(December 1998). Farther afield, these studies and observations should call into question the conventional definition of economic growth as simply more products or
services or revenues.
44. See Brian Headd, “Redefining Business Success: Distinguishing Between Closure and Failure,” Small Business Economics, vol. 21, 51–61 (August 2003).
45. See Brian Headd and Bruce Kirchhoff, “The Growth, Decline, and Survival of Small Businesses: An Exploratory Study of Life Cycles,” Journal of Small Business
Management, vol. 47, 531–550 (2009); Richard E. Caves, “Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and Mobility of Firms,” Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 36, 1947–1982 (December 1998). These and other studies also raise the question of the relationship between market selection and economic growth.
If firms that eventually survive are better endowed from the beginning (larger initial size, deeper sunk costs, better access to financing), then perhaps part of what is
perceived as an “up or out” dynamic among any given cohort of companies—as well as the number of jobs retained in surviving firms—merely reflects the
disappearance of originally weaker (and smaller) firms. Those left standing, that is, might have been better off and bigger to begin with, and economic growth results
from the discovery and winnowing process. As Caves observes, “the new evidence imputes more rationality to entrants’ decisions than has generally been assigned to
them.” Caves, supra at 1961. A new company that starts out small (whether in employment size or capital commitments) may have a lower expectation of survival
than one that starts out larger. Subsequent survival rates may thus reflect this initial calculus. At the same time, the rapid growth seen in some groups of surviving
firms may reflect a rational decision to start small and “discover” the firm’s competence—rapid growth would thus represent a response to feedback that the firm was
competent to compete, with heavier investment on a smaller starting base constituting the rapid growth. Farther afield, these studies and observations should call into
question the conventional definition of economic growth as simply more products or services or revenues.
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46. See Sheryl L. Konigsberg, James R. Spletzer, and David M. Talan, “Business Employment Dynamics: Tabulations by Size of Employment Change,” Monthly Labor
Review, April 2009, at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2009/04/art2full.pdf.
47. See, e.g., Paul Ormerod, Why Most Things Fail: Evolution, Extinction, and Economics (Pantheon, 2005).
48. “In general, incorporating turnover into traditional industrial organization clarifies how underlying structure shapes the environment in which market outcomes
are determined.” Richard E. Caves, “Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and Mobility of Firms,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 36,
1947–1982 (December 1998).
49. See Arnold Kling, “What is Job Creation?” July 15, 2010, at http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2010/07/what_is_job_cre.html.
50. This is, perhaps, a suggestive line of future research that falls out of this paper. See, supra note 43.
constituted by simultaneously rising gross job 
gains and rising gross job losses, particularly in 
large batches.46 As we have seen, over a long
enough period of time, most companies do not
survive; this holds equally true for various other
economic components, such as industries and
individual products.47 No analysis of economic
dynamics, including job creation, can be complete
without a consideration of firm exit.
Conclusion: What Do the
Underlying Dynamics
Mean?
Discussions of economic policy often revolve
around idiosyncratic factors, such as changes in tax
rates or breakthrough innovations. Often neglected
are the structural features of an economy that help
shape the world in which such idiosyncratic factors
operate. This is not to say that the American
economy or any economy operates in a deterministic
fashion, and it is understandable that structural
features go overlooked. By virtue of being
structurally embedded, they can be easily
overlooked. But if we are to understand the reasons
behind certain economic phenomena—and if we
would like those phenomena to persist—we would
do well to pay attention to these structural
features.48 Without understanding them, we could
very well undermine them and thus lose the job-
creating benefits of new and young companies.
New and young companies do indeed account for
most net job creation in the U.S. economy, but this
is due, in part, to their status as the largest
demographic category of companies. This paper has,
in part, removed any bias in either direction
surrounding new and young companies, and has
treated their role as a feature of a functioning
economy. It also means that job creation actually
may be a secondary story in the American economy
because it reflects underlying dynamics that have
been remarkably persistent for three decades (and, if
prior studies are accepted as comparable, nearly a
century). We should not accept or try to understand
this reality in terms of a “just so” narrative—as if it
is perfectly natural that new and young firms
contribute most net new jobs because they are seen
as somehow superior to older and larger companies.
Just as Kimura’s work did, this should raise the issue
of causality in economic change. It is nearly
impossible to reconstruct the causal chain of most
economic developments. There is simply too much
variability, too many unseen factors that play a part.
The structural dimension presented here allows us to
see some measure of order in the process of firm
formation and job creation. At the same time,
however, that structural order should not be
overplayed and may actually point in a direction
away from the firm as the analytical locus of job
creation.49 The fact that any particular firm or class
of firms can be said to create X number of jobs also
reflects a host of factors aside from the firm itself.50
Still, this should not denigrate the importance of
new and young companies and the jobs they create.
After all, the reality of firm dynamics presented here
is premised on certain truths that are not
immutable: a more or less steady inflow of startups;
more or less consistent survival rates from year to
year; and roughly equal levels of gross job creation
and destruction in older companies that tend to
cancel each other out on a net basis. These should
not be seen as functions of mathematical
inevitability—they are the reasons behind the
mathematical probabilities described here. This is
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similar to the research on the distribution of firm
size, where the power law distribution is not
random, but is the result of “purposive behavior on
the part of the individual agents in the market.”51
There are reasons behind the regularity, just as with
the age distribution here.
If the level of firm formation were more volatile, if
older companies created more jobs than they
destroyed, if young firms were somehow suppressed
in their hiring and growth, the dynamics of firm
accumulation and subsequent job creation would be
dramatically different. But, over the past three
decades in the United States (and perhaps the last
century), these variables have held true and have
come together to create something that does
resemble a mathematical function, or at least a
matter of higher probability. In any given year, new
and young companies constitute the largest
demographic bloc of firms in the United States. We
should expect, therefore, that they will create the
largest number of new jobs.52
One upshot is that the dynamics of firm
accumulation underscore the overriding importance
of firm formation to economic growth—not in any
revolutionary sense, but in the neutralist sense of a
steady baseline beat of firm entry and exit, a
structural premise of which other economic
phenomena are incidents. Take, for example, the
relationship between firm formation and
accumulation, and the disproportionate
contributions of high-growth firms. Prior research
has highlighted the importance of high-growth
firms, but we have yet to consider their importance
in any sort of structural context.53 Aggregate job
creation, whether by firm age or firm size, is not the
whole story. Beneath the surface, together with the
employment churn already discussed, is a relatively
small number of growing businesses that account
for a disproportionate share of new jobs.54 While we
might be able to say, therefore, that young firms
dominate job creation in part because of sheer
volume, it does not settle the overall question of job
creation, because within the various age cohorts of
firms are these high-growth firms. Even here,
however, there would seem to be a relationship
between the a priori level of firm formation, the
ensuing structural dynamics, and the subsequent
emergence of high-growth firms. In fact, this
perspective might make high-growth firms seem less
interesting than they are thought to be: In an
economy with healthy levels of firm entry, exit, and
inter-firm productivity reallocation, we should expect
that the resulting picture of firm performance
follows a Pareto distribution. Such a distribution can
be seen to be premised on the structure of firm
formation, exit, and accumulation.55
This way of looking at high-growth firms takes us
back to the neutralist view with which this paper
began—if high-growth firms and the job creation
record of new and young companies are partly
incidents of these underlying dynamics, then we 
can see the process of economic selection and
propagation acting upon this important baseline 
of firms being created and accumulating over time.
When they come into existence, for example,
startup firms create, on average, three millions jobs
per year. Many of these jobs are lost and new ones
are created, but employment at the moment of
startup is not reached again in subsequent years.56
51. Philip Ball, Critical Mass: How One Thing Leads to Another 266 (FSG, 2004). For a brief look at the distribution of firm exits, see William Cook and Paul
Ormerod, “Power Law Distribution of the Frequency of Demises of U.S. Firms,” Volterra Consulting, April 2002.
52. This says nothing, of course, of economic contributions such as innovation and productivity.
53. See Sheryl L. Konigsberg, James R. Spletzer, and David M. Talan, “Business Employment Dynamics: Tabulations by Size of Employment Change,” Monthly Labor
Review, April 2009, at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2009/04/art2full.pdf; and Dane Stangler, “High-Growth Firms and the Future of the American Economy,”
Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth, March 2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/high-growth-firms-study.pdf.
54. Additionally, beneath the aggregate surface are a number of factors that seem to be shared among new businesses that survive and those that do not. See Brian
Headd, “Redefining Business Success: Distinguishing Between Closure and Failure,” Small Business Economics, vol. 21, 51–61 (August 2003).
55. See, e.g., L.A.N. Amaral, et al., “A Model for the Growth Dynamics of Economic Organizations,” Physica A 299 127 (2001) (finding consistent scaling results
across various industries and measures of firm size; “These two points suggest that universality is present in the growth dynamics of business firms.”). 
56. Michael Horrell and Robert Litan, “After Inception: How Enduring is Job Creation by Startups?” Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and
Economic Growth, July 2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/firm-formation-inception-8-2-10.pdf. See also Brian Headd, “An Analysis of Small Business
and Jobs,” Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, March 2010, at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs359tot.pdf. (“In short, the employment effect of a
cohort of businesses is greater at birth than in any subsequent year.”)
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New and young firms immediately are subject to 
the world of selective winnowing, throwing the
importance of these structural dynamics into
especially high relief.
An unavoidable question, however, is how and
when the equilibria—relatively steady levels of firm
entry and exit—discussed here might change. What
endogenous factors could, for example, cause the
rate at which companies are created to increase? 
To approach the question from a cost perspective,
many argue persuasively that the cost of company
creation has declined (in some cases precipitously) 
in recent years. In information technology, a
combination of decreasing infrastructure costs,
lower distribution costs, and widespread open
source means that what a decade ago cost 
$2 million to $3 million now often costs a fraction
of that, perhaps as little as $100,000. While cost
declines in other sectors are not as sharp, they often
are still meaningful. The result is a declining cost of
company creation, one that has lowered the barriers
to growth entrepreneurship, especially for younger
people with limited or no access to capital. 
At the same time, there is an evolution underway
in risk capital markets. The emergence of
professional, seed-centric acceleration programs
(e.g., TechStars, Y Combinator, Betaworks, etc.) has
made it easier for a larger amount of company
creation experimentation to take place. Rather than
requiring $3 million to $5 million in investment, and
then $100 million and larger exits, these smaller
funding groups will invest as little $50,000, thus
requiring much smaller exits for profitable returns,
all predicated on the costs of company creation and
initial customer acquisition having declined
sufficiently to make a smaller risk capital infusion
productive.
What do these changes in company creation
dynamics mean? They suggest that it is possible that
there is a structural change underway in the rate at
which new companies are created in the United
States. While information technology companies
represent only a small subset of all companies being
created, the effects being felt there are being felt
elsewhere. For example, new service companies
increasingly find customers through online rating
services, lowering their marketing costs and
increasing their reach. Similarly, it has become much
easier for researchers to share information on
difficult problems in areas like biology and clean
tech, thus facilitating sharing and collaboration, with
a corresponding impact on costs and the likelihood
of commercialization. Recall, too, that a higher level
of firm creation should bring with it a higher level of
failure—and this will be a good thing. Greater
volumes of experimentation promise higher
probabilities of success (and, thus, economic
growth), but also bring, naturally, greater volumes of
failure. In one sense, then, we could be moving
from one neutral state to another. The effect, in
total, is that there are reasons to imagine that
company creation dynamics, while neutral and
surprisingly static over time, traverse an economic
landscape driven by more than entrepreneurial
opportunity recognition. The structural dynamics
analyzed here represent only one dimension of that
economic landscape.
The analogy drawn here between the neutral
theory of evolutionary change, and firm formation
and accumulation is, of course, imprecise. There is
still considerable heterogeneity within the structure
presented here; what this analysis seems to suggest
is the existence of a dual microeconomic structure
beneath the aggregate picture of job creation. The
first is the structure outlined here; the second is the
dynamic of churn among firms and individuals
across all sectors. But this, too, echoes the role of
neutralism in evolutionary theory. Part of what
Kimura achieved was to establish a baseline of
genetic change for assessing adaptation and
selection processes, and to show that there is an
orderly dimension to selection. Startups represent
the raw material of economic selection but, from an
aggregate perspective, they are also much more
than that. The twin forces of a constant level of firm
formation and steady survival rates together
constitute a structure that exerts a shaping influence
on subsequent economic developments. New and
young companies are not merely passive targets of
economic selection—they help set the terms,
particularly the pace, for that selection.
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